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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 19-1466 
___________ 
 
NNAMDI RABBI AWOMOKORIE, 
   Petitioner 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
   Respondent 
____________________________________ 
 
On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency No. A063-937-008) 
Immigration Judge:  Honorable John P. Ellington 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
August 15, 2019 
Before:  GREENAWAY, JR., RESTREPO and FUENTES, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: September 12, 2019) 
___________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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Nnamdi Rabbi Awomokorie petitions for review of an order of the Board of 
Immigration Appeals (BIA) which dismissed his appeal from a removal order issued by 
an Immigration Judge (IJ).  We will deny the petition for review.   
Awomokorie, a native and citizen of Nigeria, entered the United States as a 
Lawful Permanent Resident in 2015.  In June 2017, he pleaded guilty to one count of 
theft in an amount less than $1500 in violation of Del. Code Ann. Tit. 11 § 841 (2012), 
and the state court sentenced him to a one-year term of imprisonment, with all but four 
days suspended, and a year of probation.  After he violated the terms of his parole, the 
trial court amended the sentence slightly to order that Awomokorie be incarcerated for 
more of his one-year sentence than before.  In 2018, the Department of Homeland 
Security filed a notice to appear, charging Awomokorie with removability as an 
aggravated felon under INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) for the 2017 theft conviction.  See INA 
§ 101(a)(43)(G).  
Awomokorie, through counsel, conceded the charge, and the IJ found him 
removable.  The IJ continued the hearing several times in order for Awomokorie to file 
an application for relief from removal.  When Awomokorie did not submit any, the IJ 
ordered him removed to Nigeria.  Awomokorie, proceeding pro se, appealed, challenging 
the removability determination despite his concession and claiming that his counsel had 
rendered ineffective assistance.  The BIA rejected his arguments and dismissed the 
appeal.  Awomokorie timely petitioned for review pro se.1  
                                              
1 He previously filed a motion for a stay of removal, which we denied.   
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We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a), but because of Awomokorie’s 
conviction, our review is confined to constitutional and legal claims.  See 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1252(a)(2)(C), (D).  We review any such claims de novo.  See Mudric v. Att’y Gen., 
469 F.3d 94, 97 (3d Cir. 2006).  Awomokorie challenges his removability on two main 
grounds; neither has merit.   
First, in his brief, Awomokorie raises arguments related to his theft conviction.  
Largely, his challenge is a collateral attack on his state conviction.2  However, that 
challenge exceeds the scope of removal proceedings.  See Giammario v. Hurney, 311 
F.2d 285, 287 (3d Cir. 1962) (holding that petitioner could not challenge underlying 
conviction for removal in the context of a petition for review of a BIA order); see also 
Drakes v. INS, 330 F.3d 600, 603 (3d Cir. 2003) (rejecting collateral attack of a criminal 
conviction that provided basis of removal through a 28 U.S.C. § 2241 petition).  To the 
extent that we may construe his arguments as a claim that his conviction did not qualify 
as an aggravated felony (as he argued to the BIA and stated on the face of his petition for 
review), we reject his claim.  The BIA correctly concluded that his conviction qualified 
as an aggravated felony, and that the sentence imposed – not the time actually served – is 
the critical factor in determining whether a criminal conviction is an aggravated felony.  
                                              
2 His mention of a “motion to vacate his conviction or reduce sentence” also seems to 
relate to the challenge to his conviction that he raises in this Court.  Insofar as he is 
communicating that he was found removable while he had some sort of post-conviction 
challenge to his conviction pending, we note that maintaining a post-conviction challenge 
in state court does not otherwise affect the finality of a conviction for immigration 
removal purposes, unless and until the conviction is overturned.  See Paredes v. Att’y 
Gen., 528 F.3d 196, 198-99 (3d Cir. 2008).   
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See INA § 101(a)(43)(G) (stating that a theft conviction qualifies when a term of 
imprisonment of at least a year is imposed); § 101(a)(48)(B) (providing that “any 
suspension of the imposition or execution of” the confinement or sentence, in whole or in 
part, is disregarded in determining whether the “at least one year” requirement is met).   
Awomokorie secondly argues that his counsel did not effectively represent him 
because counsel “missed a court date.”  While his status as an aggravated felon does not 
prevent our review of his ineffective assistance of counsel claim, see INA § 242(a)(2)(D), 
the claim as presented lacks merit.  As a threshold matter, he did not meet the procedural 
requirements set out in Matter of Lozada, 19 I. & N. Dec. 637, 639 (BIA 1988).  See 
Fadiga v. Att’y Gen., 488 F.3d 142, 155 (3d Cir. 2007) (holding that a litigant must 
provide an affidavit with relevant facts, demonstrate that he informed counsel and 
provide counsel’s response, and state whether he reported counsel’s actions to the 
appropriate disciplinary authority, and if not, why not).  We would add that, in any event, 
the BIA rightly concluded that his claim that counsel did not attend a hearing 
(Awomokoire does not specify which one) was factually incorrect.  According to the 
record, counsel appeared at the hearings that he was obligated to on Awomokorie’s 
behalf.3   
For the above reasons, we will deny the petition for review. 
                                              
3 Awomokorie does not appear to take issue with his counsel’s telephonic appearance at 
some master calendar hearings, nor would it be a meritorious challenge here.  We note 
that, during the August hearing, the parties waived appearances in advance of the brief 
September 11, 2018 hearing during which the IJ entered the removal order.   
